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ABSTRACT: Piracy, once a novel phenomenon in the already altered security environment 
along Somali coasts following the millennium, has become a factor threatening the 
stability of the region. This is despite the fact that along African coastlines steady inter-
national military presence has always been ensured, since 70 percent of the European 
Union’s sea trade is conducted through this region. France – putting into action both 
its political and military powers – has actively participated in the fight against piracy in 
the region by providing continual as well as situational aid, which in my opinion proves 
both France’s interest in the region as well as their aspiration to be an all-time leading 
power in Europe. Moreover, demonstrating and analysing France’s participation might 
also contribute to pre-planning future naval operations as regards asymmetric conflicts. 
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REASONS FOR AND BACKGROUND OF PIRACY  
IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
First of all, historical reasons behind piracy in this region must be explained . In 1960, So-
malia was established by uniting territories formerly belonging to British as well as Italian 
colonies . Alluding to its geographical location, the country is generally referred to as the 
Horn of Africa, where a civil war broke out in the mid-80s overthrowing former dictator 
Mahammad Siyaad Barre and his regime, who had seized power in 1969 by staging a coup1 
following a short-lived democratic government . After a series of coups d’état in the late 
1980s and early 1990s it was by no means possible to establish a stable political system, and 
the different political powers have so far been incapable of creating a separation of powers. 
Following the commencing of armed fights among the clans, the country began to decline 
not only politically, but also economically . As a result, due to a lack of centralized power the 
area today has become a state suffering from the battles of its warlords. Previously termed a 
‘failed state’2, today it is most commonly called a ‘fragile state’ . In 2018 it came in second 
1 Kiss, Á. P., Besenyő, J. and Resperger, I. Szomália: Országismertető. Budapest: Honvéd Vezérkar Tudományos 
Kutatóhely, MH GEOSZ, 2014 . 40 .
2 Failed states; according to the definition, born at the end of the Cold War, a failed state is a state which is inter-
nationally acknowledged as a sovereign state, yet has no functioning central governing power, thus cannot attend 
to the most basic tasks in international context. Hegedűs, K. “Tizenhárom év anarchia: Szomália a hidegháború 
után” . Külügyi Szemle 4/1–2 . 2005 . 37–62 .
 https://kki.hu/assets/upload/KULUGY_KulugyiSzemle_2005__1-2hegedus.pdf
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on the Fragile States Index by 113 .2 points, indicating a state that is still weak and presents 
security risks .3 
Figure 1: Fragile States Index 2018 
Source: “Fragile States Index”. The Fund for Peace. http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/; “Fragile States 
Index: Global Data”. The Fund for Peace. http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/data/, Accessed on 14 May 
2018. (Edited by Eva Fabian)
3 “Fragile States Index: Global Data” . The Fund for Peace . http://fundforpeace .org/fsi/data/, Accessed on 14 May 
2018. “The Fragile States Index is based on a conflict assessment framework – known as “CAST” – that was 
developed by FFP nearly a quarter-century ago for assessing the vulnerability of states to collapse . The CAST 
framework was designed to measure this vulnerability in pre-conflict, active conflict and post-conflict situations, 
and continues to be used widely by policy makers, field practitioners, and local community networks. The meth-
odology uses both qualitative and quantitative indicators, relies on public source data, and produces quantifiable 
results. Twelve conflict risk indicators are used to measure the condition of a state at any given moment.” “Frag-
ile States Index: Indicators” . The Fund for Peace . http://fundforpeace .org/fsi/indicators/, Accessed on 14 May 
2018 . The indicators used both in the CAST framework and also in the Fragile States Index are as follows: Se-
curity Apparatus, Factionalized Elites, Group Grievance, Economic Decline and Poverty, Uneven Development, 
Human Flight and Brain Drain, State Legitimacy, Public Services, Human Rights and Rule of Law, Demographic 
Pressure, Refugees and IDPs, External Intervention . “Fragile States Index and Cast Framework Methodology” . 
The Fund for Peace . 13 May 2017 . http://fundforpeace .org/fsi/2017/05/13/fragile-states-index-and-cast-frame-
work-methodology/, Accessed on 14 May 2018 .
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In the instability after the civil war and in the absence of central political control, pirate 
fishing got underway, which particularly posed a problem for those living along the coast-
line, for whom fishing was almost the only way of making a living. The first of the pirates 
were fishermen who meant to drive away directly competing foreign ships from their waters. 
This affair increased in intensity when warlords of the Somali coastline saw it as an opportu-
nity to make money, and therefore set up their own militias . Although it was not until April 
2005 that the first large foreign ship was attacked, this incident was soon followed by a great 
number of such attacks. In conclusion, the sea-bandits’ gangs consisted of former fishermen, 
seamen as well as recruited members of military groups4. The first raids were conducted in 
and around the Gulf of Aden – where the annual traffic of about 20,000 commercial ships is 
managed, and which is also considered the most important transport route between Asia and 
Europe – though by now the piracy hotspots have relocated to the waters further out .5 Piracy 
in the area undoubtedly became socially accepted . It is no great surprise that pirates grew 
in strength and organization and called themselves coast guardsmen rather than pirates .6 In 
general, each pirate group has their own set of rules regarding recruitment, treatment of hos-
tages as well as division of the spoils . Although we consider them to be several rival groups 
of pirates, their methods as well as structural hierarchy are practically identical . Most of 
them – being former fishermen – have a significant amount of local knowledge, yet the small 
fishing boats they used at first are constantly modernized.7 Their weaponry is obtained in 
Mogadishu black markets as well as in Yemen, applying the informal, trust-based, traditional 
hawala mediator system .8 
STEPS TAKEN BY THE INTERNATIONAL  
COMMUNITY 
The humanitarian disaster urged the United Nations to launch humanitarian operations . The 
United Nations Operation in Somalia I and then II (UNISOM) took place alongside the US-
led international United Task Force (UNITAF). Blue Helmets first arrived there in September 
1992, and their numbers grew rapidly owing to the increasingly disastrous conditions . The 
International Committee of the Red Cross as well as other aid organizations conducted hu-
manitarian actions in the area, which – at least at the time – were regarded as the largest of 
their kind since World War II. The course of events significantly changed in July 1993. Upon 
overthrowing Barre’s regime, the country’s two most powerful figures were Ali Mahdi, an 
influential businessman, and General Aideed, who nevertheless never managed to reach an 
4 Pirates are divided into three categories. There are one-time fishermen, who also know the sea inside and out. 
There are former militiamen, who used to fight for the clan of a warlord, and there are technology experts, who 
are computer-literate, and have knowledge of various high-tech devices and can handle GPS, satellite phones and 
the like . “Lutter contre la piraterie” . France, Ministry of Defence . https://www .defense .gouv .fr/lutterContrePi-
raterieWeb/, Accessed on 3 June 2018 .
5 “Lutter contre la piraterie” . France, Ministry of Defence . https://www .defense .gouv .fr/lutterContrePiraterieWeb/, 
Accessed on 3 June 2018 .
6 Hunter, R . “Somali pirates living the high life” . BBC . http://news .bbc .co .uk/2/hi/africa/7650415 .stm, Accessed 
on 20 December 2010 .
7 “Lutter contre la piraterie” . France, Ministry of Defence . https://www .defense .gouv .fr/lutterContrePiraterieWeb/, 
Accessed on 3 June 2018 .
8 Mayyasi, A . “Hawala: The working Man’s Bitcoin” . Priceonomics . https://priceonomics .com/hawala-the-work-
ing-mans-bitcoin/, Accessed on 22 April 2017 .
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agreement and actually divided the capital city of Mogadishu into two parts. Both made efforts 
to extend their control over other areas in Somalia. The fight previously between the latter war-
lord and United Nations (UN) as well as the United States (US) troops resulted in turning the 
clans controlling Mogadishu against the foreign troops, so the operation went amiss . Somalia’s 
self-appointed president Mohamed Farrah Aideed’s militiamen began combating American 
soldiers . Because of this failure and pressure from the general public, then US President Bill 
Clinton had withdrawn the American troops – sent by George H . W . Bush – from the area by 
spring 1994, whilst the UN mission was obliged to cease its operation in March 1995 .9 
Adverse changes in the 1990s led to the establishment of several separatist state forms in 
the Horn of Africa, which all took advantage of the weakness of the central administration . 
One of these areas was Puntland, established in 1998, where the majority of Somali pirates 
originated . Due to the present state of the country the various territories are functioning 
autonomously, making their own political decisions . Following the 2012 elections it was 
generally thought that the ‘federal system had found a way in Somalia, creating hope for the 
formation of would-be federal member states in which law and order can be restored at the 
grass root level .’10 Nevertheless, as Viktor Marsai expressed in a 2017 article, since the ‘fed-
eral member states have fallen into the hands of wrangling clans and sub-clans, some people 
describe Somali federalism as the Balkanization of the country’11 . In his opinion, during the 
last (i .e . 2016) elections the clans, which – according to several experts, international public 
figures, as well as the Somali themselves – serve as the foundation of the Somali political 
establishment, as well as the Somali elite, some foreigners, and al-Shabaab all played major 
parts in the political dynamism .12 
After the discontinuation of the central governmental power, the influence of Islamic 
law (also known as Sharia) increased . In 2000, 11 Mogadishu courts were united, establish-
ing the Islamic Courts Union (ICU)13, which was to join with different Islamic movements 
in the whole of Somalia . One of their strongest military groups is Al-Shabaab . ICU’s sphere 
of action covered the whole of Mogadishu by 2006, as well as most of South and Cen-
tral Somalia, yet it was overthrown by the Ethiopian army in January 2007 .14 Al-Shabaab 
launched guerrilla activities . With UN authorization, in February 2007 the peacekeepers of 
the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) commenced their activities in Somali 
territories and managed to push Al-Shabaab forces out of the larger cities .15 Al-Shabaab has 
since then been continually attacking both army and civilian targets throughout Somalia, 
Kenya, and Uganda . Their main goal is to overthrow the internationally supported federal 
government of Somalia . The mission of AMISOM has not achieved all that was expected: 
the counterinsurgency operations of the African Union troops and Somali government forces 
9 Kiss, Besenyő and Resperger. Szomália… 52–53 .
10 Tawane, A . A . “Federalism in Africa: The case of Somalia” . Pambazuka News . 6 April 2017 . https://www .pam-
bazuka .org/governance/federalism-africa-case-somalia, Accessed on 23 October 2018 .
11 Marsai, V . “Somali elections in 2016-2017 – Business as usual or a new hope?” . Center for Strategic and Defense 
Studies Analyses 14 . 2017 . 1–12 . http://archiv.netk.uni-nke.hu/uploads/media_items/csds-analyses-2017-14-so-
mali-elections-in-2016-2017-marsai-v .original .pdf, Accessed on 4 November 2018 .
12 More of this analysis in Marsai, V . “Somali elections in 2016-2017 – Business as usual or a new hope?” . Center 
for Strategic and Defense Studies Analyses 14 . 2017 . 1–12 . http://archiv.netk.uni-nke.hu/uploads/media_items/
csds-analyses-2017-14-somali-elections-in-2016-2017-marsai-v .original .pdf, Accessed on 4 November 2018 .
13 Midowga Maxkamadaha Islaamiga
14 The US was in favour of this operation, since they assumed close connection between the ICU and al-Qaeda .
15 “Brief History” . AMISOM . http://amisom-au .org/about-somalia/brief-history/, Accessed on 30 October 2017 .
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have failed to blunt Al-Shabaab’s capacity to inflict heavy civilian and military casualties.16 
This fact along with the weakness and low public acceptance of the federal government ex-
plain why the armed group has been gaining territories in the area in the past few years . Still, 
the group neither entertains global terrorist ambitions nor has such capacities . Al-Shabaab 
was also able to step up its deadly actions despite a greater frequency of United States drone 
attacks since President Trump’s inauguration .17 Altogether 10,535 Africans lost their lives 
because of militant Islamists’ actions between May 2017 and May 2018, which is – while 
greater than the number of fatalities in the previous 12 months – definitely lower than it was 
in 2015 .18  
16 Adan, A . M . “Al-Shabab ranked as deadliest terror group in Africa” . Hiriaan . https://www .hiiraan .com/
news4/2018/May/157875/al_shabab_ranked_as_deadliest_terror_group_in_africa.aspx, Accessed on 23 Octo-
ber 2018 .
17 Since the beginning of 2017 .
18 There were 18 .728 deaths in total in 2015 . Adan, A . M . “Al-Shabab ranked as deadliest terror group in Africa” . 
Hiriaan . https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2018/May/157875/al_shabab_ranked_as_deadliest_terror_group_
in_africa.aspx, Accessed on 23 October 2018 . Nevertheless, the 2015 mortality rates – even compared to those 
Figure 2: Somalia Federal States map 
Source: “Somali update, latest Somalia news and analysis”. Africa news online. http://www.
africanews.online/somalie/somali-update-latest-somalia-news-and-analysis-2/, Accessed on 23 
October 2018.
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DIRECT ANTECEDENTS, FORMATION, AND RUNNING  
OF OPERATION ATALANTA
Modern-day piracy has become a problem of globalization which the international com-
munity has had to tackle to an ever-greater extent . France realized this long before NATO, 
and before the launch of the all-European cooperation . On 10 July 2007, indicating 
their despair, the World Food Programme (WFP) and the International Maritime Bureau 
(IMB)19 appealed to the general public in a call for international cooperation against pi-
racy along the coastline of the Horn of Africa as well as for protecting humanitarian aid 
to Somalia . As a response, on 25 September, during the 62nd Session of the UN General 
Assembly, President Nicolas Sarkozy announced that France would send a warship to 
protect WFP ships . On 16 November 2007 Operation Alcyon commenced . The task was 
taken over on 2 February 2008 by the Danish Navy, and numerous nations joined the 
initiative . On 15 September 2008, following France and Spain’s suggestion, the Council 
of Europe in Brussels decided to establish the European Union Naval Coordination Cell 
(EUNAVCO), in the framework of which a European commercial ship was first escorted 
through the Gulf of Aden by a French warship on 12 October 2008 . EUNAVCO served as 
the European coordination network of the fight against piracy at sea. Among its tasks, it 
partly coordinated measures taken by member states within their national missions with 
regard to the battle against piracy, and also informed European ship-owners about military 
assets . Within its framework France made it possible for 20 commercial ships altogether 
to safely pass the Gulf of Aden . The Coordination Unit ceased to exist once Operation At-
alanta was launched, with no legal successor .20 On 24 October of the same year, Operation 
Allied Provider was launched, being the first NATO operation in the fight against Somali 
pirate activities .21
The UN-mandated EUNAVFOR, commonly known as Operation Atalanta, was 
launched on 8 December 2008 by the EU as the first European operation at sea with the hope 
of successfully countering, preventing, and tackling piracy and armed robbery along the So-
mali coastline . Their mandate was for a one-year period, which has been prolonged several 
times . The event itself was preceded by an Action Plan approved on 10 November 2008 in 
the Council of the European Union regarding the launch of the first naval operation of the 
of 2011 – were much better, for which Viktor Marsai in a 2015 article of his provides a less scientific but even 
more interesting and telling example: ‘…in January 2013 an al-Jazeera journalist interviewed gravediggers 
from Mogadishu . One of them, Ali Hassan took up this profession in 1991 . (…) In 2011 there were still 14 
gravediggers in the cemetery called Abdirrashid Ahmed Sharmake in the capital, working seven days a week, 
whilst today only two of them are still doing the job, Hassan and another undertaker . The decreasing number 
of the deceased – also meaning less income for the undertakers – is reported by other providers in the funeral 
and related services, such as textile sellers, who sell white caftans to wrap the deceased with .’ Marsai, V . 
“A szomáli szövetségi kormány első két éve és az al-Sabáb elleni katonai műveletek 2012-2014. (I.)”. Nemzet 
és Biztonság 8/1 . 2015 . 72 . http://www.nemzetesbiztonsag.hu/cikkek/nb_2015_1_08_marsai.pdf, Accessed 
on 4 November 2018 .
19 You can read more about the IMB on their official website. “International Maritime Bureau”. ICC CSS. 
 https://www .icc-ccs .org/icc/imb, Accessed on 2 June 2018 .
20 “L’action de la France dans la lutte contre le piraterie” . France, Ministry of Defence . 12 July 2010 . https://www .
defense .gouv .fr/operations/operations/piraterie/dossier-de-presentation-des-operations/l-action-de-la-france-
dans-la-lutte-contre-la-piraterie, Accessed on 2 June 2018 .
21 “Operation Allied Provider” . NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe . https://shape .nato .int/
page13984631, Accessed on 2 June 2018 .
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integration . The latter was backed by the UN Security Council as closely related to their 
resolutions (numbers 1814, 1816, 1838, 1846 and 1851) regarding the fight against Somali 
piracy . Among the aims of Operation Atalanta are listed the protection of WFP and other 
ships22 in danger which navigate in the Gulf of Aden as well as off the Somali coasts and 
near the Seychelles Islands, the prevention of and measures taken against pirate activities 
and armed robberies along the coastline, as well as controlling fishing along Somali coastal 
areas . EUNAVFOR became the integral part of the European integration’s security and de-
fence policy . Another goal is to support other EU missions and international organizations 
that aim to promote maritime security and strengthen capacity in the region . Regarding the 
operation’s mandate, apart from protecting the WFP, AMISOM and commercial ships, the 
participants were authorized to employ any means – including armed force – to attain the 
above-mentioned goals only and exclusively in the zone where these activities are carried 
out . Numerous countries – based on their military potential – participated in the opera-
tion, namely: the Netherlands, Spain, Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Sweden, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, and Estonia – indicating that Atalanta is indeed a European military action . 
Moreover, on 3 January 2014, a Ukrainian frigate joined the operation . The French have 
been present from the very beginning in the EUNAVFOR units, continuously represented by 
one frigate23 and occasionally dispatching their Atlantique 2 maritime patrol aircraft, based 
in Djibouti, where the Joint Force Command Headquarters is located . The French assist in 
the operation’s success with the logistics base in Djibouti, too .24 The Area of Operations 
covers the southern territories of the Red Sea, the area of the Gulf of Aden and part of the 
Indian Ocean, including the Seychelles Islands . EUNAVFOR units deter attacks and show 
military presence in the Area of Operations and Somali coastal waters, as well as constantly 
escort ships, in accordance with the UN Security Council’s relevant regulations . Naturally, 
in the area in question several nations’ navies are operating, with which EUNAVFOR has 
developed a broad network of connections by now .25
22 For example, consignments launched by AMISOM as well as commercial and passenger ships .
23 On 1 July 2009, the French (at the request of a group of ship-owners) established the so-called onboard protec-
tion teams (EPE – équipes de protection embarquées) Seychelles mission, with the help of which French fishing 
boats are directly protected on board, when they operate along the Seychelles . The number of states involved in 
the EPE as well as their operational area has increased year by year . In June 2011 Estonia joined the EPE which 
has contributed to the success of Operation Atalanta since November 2010 . “Atalante: les équipes de protection 
embarqués, image de la cooperation européenne” . France, Ministry of Defence . 3 August 2011 . https://www .
defense .gouv .fr/operations/operations/piraterie/actualites/atalante-les-equipes-de-protection-embarquees-im-
age-de-la-cooperation-europeenne, Accessed on 19 February 2018 .
24 “Opération EU NAVFOR Somalia/Atalante” . France, Ministry of Defence . https://www .defense .gouv .fr/oper-
ations/operations/piraterie/dossier-de-presentation-des-operations/operation-eu-navfor-somalie-atalante, Accessed 
on 15 March 2017 .
25 Since the end of 2008 more and more countries have been sending battleships to the Gulf of Aden as well 
as to the Somali coasts, which do not belong to any multinational forces, yet closely cooperate with the EU-
NAVFOR . It means about 10-15 battleships . “Opération EU NAVFOR Somalia/Atalante” . France, Ministry 
of Defence . https://www .defense .gouv .fr/operations/operations/piraterie/dossier-de-presentation-des-operations/
operation-eu-navfor-somalie-atalante, Accessed on 15 March 2017 .
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Figure 3: Fight against Somali piracy – Area of Operations 
Source: Maritime security chart: Q6099: Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea. UK 
Hydrographic Office. https://www.admiralty.co.uk/AdmiraltyDownloadMedia/Security%20
Related%20Information%20to%20Mariners/Q6099_A4.pdf, Accessed on 23 October 2018.
In June 2010 the EU Foreign Affairs Council somewhat altered the concept of the op-
eration, requiring states in the region to actively participate in restoring order and peace in 
the vicinity of the Horn of Africa. Another significant development was the extension of the 
Area of operations both eastward and southward, and to address the roots of the problems 
the European Union Somalia Training Mission (EUTM)26 had also been launched, which 
26 In the battle against modern-day piracy, relying only on high-tech navy forces is not sufficient; efficient maritime 
and air force cooperation with the local armed forces is more and more necessary . The mission’s mandate was 
prolonged until 31 August 2018 .
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was expected to reinforce security forces in Somalia .27 Besides particularly representing 
the member states’ economic interests in the area, the operation also served humanitarian 
purposes in the form of humanitarian aid transferred by sea .28
The two following tables’ data on the EU Naval Force – Somalia clearly show that the 
political, legal, diplomatic, and military efforts have been fruitful. The number of pirate 
attacks has significantly decreased, the route of commercial ships in the region has become 
more secure, and owing to the extended alarm system and offers of the European Union and 
the IMB, they are more prepared against attacks .
Table 1: EU Naval Force Somalia – Operation Atalanta 
CURRENTLY HELD BY PIRATES
Vessels Held* Hostages Held**
0 0
SINCE 2009
WFP Vessels Protected 438
AMISOM Vessels Protected 139
Tonnes of Food/Aid Delivered by WFP 1,726,497***








2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 166 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Suspicious Events 8 59 99 166 74 20 5 1 2 6 1
Total Attacks 24 163 174 176 34 7 2 0 1 7 1
Of Which Pirated**** 14 46 47 25 4 0 0 0 0 2 0
Disruptions***** 0 14 65 28 16 10 1 0 0 2 0
*    Plus, an unknown number of unreported/unconfirmed dhows and smaller vessels
**  Estimated
***   Reported metric tonnes of food/aid delivered to Somali ports by World Food Programme shipping protected 
by EU NAVFOR
****   TOTAL ATTACK is the combined number of all attacks mounted by suspect pirates; those repelled/aborted 
and those leading to ships being in pirate hands and crews taken hostage
*****  An action that renders a pirate group incapable of further pirate operation
Source: “Key facts and figures”. EU Naval Force Somalia. http://eunavfor.eu/key-facts-and-
figures/, Accessed on 3 June 2018
27 “European Union Training Mission Somalia” . https://www .eutm-somalia .eu/, Accessed on 2 June 2018 .
28 “EU NAVFOR: Proud to have protected by sea over 1 .5 million tonnes of WFP humanitarian aid for people 
of Somalia” . EU NAVFOR Somalia . 4 July 2017 . http://eunavfor .eu/eu-navfor-proud-to-have-protected-by-sea-
over-1-5-million-tonnes-of-wfp-humanitarian-aid-for-people-of-somalia/, Accessed on 2 June 2018 .
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Table 2: Latest piracy incidents 
Latest Piracy Incidents




























2017/11/18 Container Attack X Safe
BMP: Best Management Practises
PASC: Private (armed) Security Company
Source: “Key facts and figures”. EU Naval Force Somalia. http://eunavfor.eu/key-facts-and-
figures/, Accessed on 3 June 2018.
THE FRENCH CONTRIBUTION AND SUCCESSES  
IN THE FIGHT AGAINST PIRATES
According to French opinions, the success story of EUNAVFOR really began in March 
2010 .29 In February 2010 the frigate Nivôse joined the operation, replacing another vessel of 
the same class Surcouf, serving till then along the East-African coastline and in the Gulf of 
Aden . First and foremost, it was ordered to provide protection – correspondingly – for com-
mercial, WFP and AMISOM ships as well as participate actively in the fight against pirates. 
Soon after it began its mission, the Nivôse and its crew achieved success as on 5 March 2010 
they successfully fended off two separate attacks. On 6 and 7 March, just off the Somali 
coast, some participating EUNAVFOR units with French leadership foiled an attack on ei-
ther day . The results at that time, however, amounted to something much greater than ever 
before. Within the course of three days, altogether 35 pirates, five mother ships and eight 
boats were taken hold of . The action executed on 7 March proved just how essential the na-
val power provided by the participating European states was in the fight against piracy, when 
applied in a combined, concerted way . The united action executed by the Nivôse, together 
with the Etna, the flagship of the operation since December 2009, their helicopters as well 
 
29 French authorities can only come to help against pirate attacks if the given vessel is flying a French flag and 
operates in a French economic sector, or if it belongs to the especially endangered ships that are protected in 
the framework of Operation Atalanta . In such cases the ships under protection must agree to change course, and 
also have to share costs regarding their safety . When a French ship is attacked, or there are French sailors and 
passengers among the pirates’ hostages, France may consider dispatching warships . “Lutter contre la piraterie” . 
France, Ministry of Defence . https://www .defense .gouv .fr/lutterContrePiraterieWeb/, Accessed on 3 June 2018 .
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as Spanish Navy reconnaissance aircraft guaranteed the eventual success . The helicopters 
played a significant role in spotting the pirates’ boats and the mother ship. Warning shots 
encouraged the African pirates to lay down their weapons, and then following their capture 
they were – together with their boats – taken on board the ships participating in the action . 
The pirates’ mother ship was, as always, sunk on the spot .30
The story, however, did not and could not end here . A great number of successful ac-
tions had justified the participation of French forces, too. On 14 August 2010 France took 
command of Operation Atalanta for four months under the leadership of Rear Adm . Philippe 
Coindreau .31 Consequently, beside their frigate and naval reconnaissance aircraft, France de-
ployed a warship to the operation . During the French leadership, the French frigate de Grasse, 
joined by the frigate Floréal on 6 September 2010, and accomplished several successful 
actions against the pirates in the Somali Basin . Within the four months of French command, 
over 120 suspected pirates were captured in over 20 actions . Coindreau handed over the 
command of the operation to the Spanish Rear Adm . Juan Rodriguez Garat in Djibouti on 10 
December 2010 .32 In the end of March 2012, France made another warship available for Op-
eration Atalanta . Between 7 April and 6 August 2012, France again commanded the operation 
under the leadership of Rear Adm . Dupuis, who handed over the command of the operation 
to his Italian colleague Enrico Credendino . For some months after 12 April 2012, four French 
vessels were involved in Operation Atalanta . On 6 December 2013, in Djibouti, France – for 
the third time – took over the command of the operation’s Task Force (TF) 465 under the 
leadership of Rear Adm . Hervé Bléjean for another four months .33 Under French leadership, 
the Amphibious Landing Dock (ALD) Siroco’s multinational staff proved to be able to suc-
cessfully cope not only with combating the pirates, but also the training of personnel from 
African states that cooperated with EUNAVFOR, showing that both the European operation 
as well as the French naval forces in the region are capable of development and renewal . This 
has been proven to date by countless examples . The French frigate La Fayette, currently serv-
ing under the ALINDIEN34, contributed to the success of Atalanta – through the suppression, 
deterrence, and prevention of piracy – in the Indian Ocean .35
For the forces taking part in the national and international cooperative effort, special 
watercraft is needed to bring firepower top bear, and prevent the pirates from succeeding 
or to attempt to free hostages . Arresting pirates, bringing them to justice and sentencing 
them appear to be complicated even today, despite the fact that there is now an international 
30 “Atalante: 35 pirates interceptés en trois jours par la frégate Nivôse” . France, Ministry of Defence . 3 July 2010 . 
https://www .defense .gouv .fr/operations/operations/piraterie/actualites/07-03-10-atalante-35-pirates-interceptes-
en-trois-jours-par-la-fregate-nivose, Accessed on 19 February 2018 .
31 “Atalante: la France prend le commandement de la force maritime européenne: vidéo” . France, Ministry of De-
fence . 17 August 2010 . https://www .defense .gouv .fr/operations/operations/piraterie/actualites/atalante-la-france- 
prend-le-commandement-de-la-force-maritime-europeenne-video, Accessed on 19 February 2018 .
32 “Atalante: la France rend le commandement de la force de l’opération” . France, Ministry of Defence . 18 Decem-
ber 2010 . https://www .defense .gouv .fr/operations/operations/piraterie/actualites/atalante-la-france-rend-le-com-
mandement-de-la-force-de-l-operation, Accessed on 19 February 2018 .
33 “Piraterie: la France prend le commandement de la force Atalante” . France, Ministry of Defence . 6 December 
2013 . https://www .defense .gouv .fr/operations/operations/piraterie/actualites/piraterie-la-france-prend-le-com-
mandement-de-la-force-atalante2, Accessed on 19 February 2018 .
34 Amiral commandant de la zone maritime de l’océan Indien et les forces maritimes de l’océan Indien .
35 “Opération Atalante: la frigate La Fayette reçoit le commandant adjoint de l’opération” . France, Ministry of 
Defence . 18 April 2018 . https://www .defense .gouv .fr/operations/operations/piraterie/actualites/operation-atalan-
te-la-fregate-la-fayette-recoit-le-commandant-adjoint-de-l-operation, Accessed on 3 June 2018 .
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agreement that makes it possible . On 6 March 2009, the EU and Kenya signed an agreement 
ordering persons accused of piracy in the framework of Operation Atalanta to be taken to 
Kenya and be tried in court there . The Seychelles Islands can also be counted on in this re-
gard, although pirates are often set free there36 . In the battle against piracy the most common 
strategy is eliminating the mother ship . There seem to be some options for commercial ships, 
too . They can, for instance, increase speed, or can attempt to cross the danger zone when 
strong wind is producing high waves that set the pirates back. Some shipping offices have 
begun to employ armed security guards, and there is also an interesting method that could 
be called maritime electric fences . This device surrounds the body of the ship and causes an 
electric shock, which may offer efficient protection. If, despite all precautions, the pirates’ 
attack is successful, ransom negotiations begin and may take weeks, even months . The ran-
som may be dropped with a parachute but if food and fuel also feature among the negotiated 
claims, it can be delivered by ship . The most important factor during a negotiation is to 
guarantee safety for the crew and the passengers, i .e . human life, which the pirates also take 
advantage of .37
For decades France has been maintaining constant military presence in the Indian Ocean, 
whilst in the Gulf of Aden the country is active in the frameworks of both national and mul-
tinational operations . ALINDIEN is in charge of the command of naval forces in the Indian 
Ocean maritime zone which extends from the Red Sea and West Africa to the Philippines as 
well as East Vietnam . Apart from military control these forces actively provide intense de-
fence diplomacy . The active participation of the French Navy in the Indian Ocean increased 
in the Gulf War of the 1990s and has not ceased since. The fight against Afghan terrorism 
also took place in this context, as well as aiding the victims of the tsunami that occurred on 
26 December 2004 . After December 2001, on the basis of the report by Control Naval Vo-
lontaire,38 France set in motion an information channel for ships, battleships and their crews 
in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. By promoting interactions between the civilian sphere and 
the military, this helps avoid potential threats or efficiently tackle them. The idea was also 
adopted by EU Operation Atalanta, which launched the Maritime Security Center – Horn 
of Africa (MSCHOA) with Northwood, UK, as its headquarters; they can offer help to all 
vessels in the zone and a kind of passive protection, thanks to its website . The MSCHOA 
has proven to be useful: due to their advice a huge percentage of ships have avoided pirate 
attacks when crossing the high-risk territory .39 
CONCLUSION
After the turn of the millennium the EU appeared as a new player in international crisis 
management . The EUNAVFOR operation, launched in December 2008, can be considered 
as one of the largest-scale military operations of the EU as I view it . The success of the in-
tegration’s foreign and defence policy was particularly palpable in this operation, in which 
36 Moreover, besides these two countries EUNAVFOR, during their operations, is already cooperating with Tanza-
nia, Uganda, Djibouti, Oman, Madagascar and Mauritius .
37 “Lutter contre la piraterie” . France, Ministry of Defence . https://www .defense .gouv .fr/lutterContrePiraterieWeb/, 
Accessed on 3 June 2018 .
38 Voluntary Navy Control (VNC)
39 “Maritime Security Centre - Horn of Africa” . MSCHOA . http://www .mschoa .org/on-shore/about-us, Accessed 
on 3 June 2018 .
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France had an important role from the very outset, and according to relevant literature: the 
French state viewed itself as one of the most decisive participants in it . Apart from the EU 
integration’s operation France flourished in the region on its own, too – for instance, within 
the framework of the above-mentioned ALINDIEN . In addition, in the course of the EU-
NAVFOR, France took initiative on several occasions and proved to be successful, showing 
that France prefer(red) to go its own separate ways from their European partners (too) . As 
an example of the latter, they launched an information channel for ships, naval vessels and 
their crews in the Pacific and Indian Ocean after December 2001, on the basis of which the 
still active and successfully operating MSCHOA was introduced; or another example is the 
EPE Seychelles mission .
In light of the above we can state that in the course of the multinational naval operation 
of the European integration not only military but also diplomatic and legislative means were 
used to fight the Somali pirates. With its naval forces France successfully participated in the 
operation – due to its nature, often in an unorthodox manner – in order to fight the asymmet-
ric challenge of the day in a greatly altered security environment .
When talking of today’s Somalia, it is no longer pirate attacks that come to our mind, 
since piracy as such has shifted to the region of the Gulf of Guinea and Southeast Asian 
waters . Nonetheless, in my opinion it is indisputable that as long as there is a chance for 
piracy to occur in the African continent, as it occurred in the case of Somalia, there will be 
pirates as well .
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